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A NEW IDEA FOR SPECIAL-EDUCATION LAW:
RESOLVING THE "APPROPRIATE" EDUCATIONAL
BENEFIT CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ENSURING A
MEANINGFUL EDUCATION FOR STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES
Scott Goldschmidt+
In its 1954 landmark decision, Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court of the United States unanimously declared that educational opportunities
must be equal for all students regardless of race.' In that opinion, then-Chief-
Justice Earl Warren asserted that "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."2
Despite this important victory for racial equality, the educational rights of
another minority, the disabled, frequently have been overlooked. In 1975, of
the eight million school-age children with disabilities living in the United
States, over one-half did not receive an appropriate education, and more than
one million were entirely excluded from the public-education system.4
According to a 1967 statistic, students excluded from the public-education
system included about two hundred thousand children with severe disabilities
who were confined to state institutions supplying only minimal food and
clothing.5  Although Brown was a clear victory for educational equality for
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1. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
2. Id. at 486, 493.
3. ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR. & CHARLES J. Russo, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW: A
GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 7 (2d ed. 2006). In the 1800s, legislation and funding for individuals
with disabilities were limited to asylums, hospitals, and specialized institutions. JIM YSSELDYKE
& BOB ALGOZZINE, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR EVERY TEACHER 10 (2006). Not until the 1950s did legislation begin to focus on "research
and training, vocational education, assessment, and special education services." Id.
4. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975); see also YSSELDYKE & ALGOZZINE, supra note 3, at
15.
5. Twenty-Five Years ofProgress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA,
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.html (last modified July
19, 2007) [hereinafter Twenty-Five Years of Progress]. Moreover, "in 1970, U.S. schools
educated only one in five children with disabilities, and many states had laws excluding certain
students, including children who were deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed, or mentally retarded."
Id.
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racial minorities, the rights of disabled children to receive the same
equal-education benefits had been ignored for decades.6
Although education is a right granted and executed by the states, the federal
government can influence state educational policy by placing conditions on the
receipt of federal money.8 In 1975, Congress recognized that disabled students
"were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in reular
classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to 'drop out' and
passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).o
The EAHCA attempted to reverse educational discrimination for students with
disabilities by mandating that these children receive a "free appropriate public
education" (FAPE)." Congress amended and strengthened the EAHCA-now
called the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)-in 1986, 1990,
6. See Editorial, The Battle over Special Education, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at A30
(describing the conditions for students with disabilities who attended schools as "resembl[ing] the
Dark Ages"); see also Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006)
(summarizing the congressional findings regarding the dismal educational opportunities for
students with disabilities before the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA)).
7. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and
which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.").
8. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress can
condition federal highway funds allocated to the states by setting a certain minimum drinking
age).
9. H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 2 (1975).
10. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). In addition to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)-the successor statute to the
EAHCA-provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (§ 504) also concern the education of students with disabilities. See
Individuals with Education Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (2006); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973); see also LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION
LAW 43 (2000). Section 504 "prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance . . . from
discriminating on the basis of disability." ROTHSTEIN, supra. The ADA prohibits disability
discrimination in particular and applies to almost all schools in the United States. Id. The IDEA
supplements these statutes by providing a basis for support services, major necessary
accommodations, and procedures focused only on the education of students with disabilities. Id.
Additionally, the IDEA is both a grants and civil rights statute, requiring "programs for children
with disabilities that are in addition to those available to children without disabilities," while §
504 and the ADA are solely civil rights statutes. NANCY LEE JONES & CAROL J. TOLAND, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., EDUCATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA), SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT, AND THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) 1 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/R40123 20100107.pdf.
11. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180-81 (1982) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 1412 (1976)).
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1997, and 2004.12 Despite substantial changes to the statute, 3 Congress has
never clarified what constitutes an "appropriate" education under the IDEA.14
Ambiguity in the language of the IDEA and its regulations regarding this
important term necessitates judicial interpretation of an "appropriate"
education. 15
A split has emerged among the United States Courts of Appeals over what
constitutes an "appropriate" education under the IDEA.16 The Supreme Court
first addressed the issue in Board of Education v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley and
established that an "appropriate education" provides "some" educational
benefit.17  Although a minimal or trivial education is not considered
"appropriate," the courts have split regarding a more specific definition of a
FAPE. A minority of circuits follows Rowley's educational-benefit standard,
but a slight majority interprets the statute as requiring a
heightened-educational-benefit standard.20 This standard generally requires a
"meaningful education benefit" and "significant leaming," as opposed to an
educational benefit that is simply more than trivial.21 As a result, students with
12. See, e.g., YSSELDYKE & ALGOZZINE, supra note 3, at 24-34 (illustrating the evolution
of the IDEA and what each series of amendments added).
13. For example, major changes in the 1997 amendments to the IDEA included "increase[d]
parental participation in the evaluation process" and changes to the statute's disciplinary policies.
Id at 27-29. Major changes in the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA include a new focus on
educational outcomes rather than compliance and that students with disabilities must be "taught
by highly qualified teachers who have full certification in special education or who pass a state
special education teacher licensing exam and hold a state license." Id. at 31.
14. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 3, at 25. Although the 2004 IDEA amendments
"provide[] very precise definitions for three dozen lexical terms or phrases used frequently within
the [IDEA's] provisions, such as 'child with disability,' 'core academic subjects,' [or] 'highly
qualified,"' the amendments fail to define "appropriate" for the phrase "'appropriate education,'
the very term that provides the basis for compliance with [the IDEA]." Andrea Blau, The IDEA
and the Right to an "Appropriate" Education, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 4-5 (emphasis
omitted).
15. See OSBORNE & RUSSO, supra note 3, at 25.
16. See infra Part I.B.2.
17. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982); OSBORNE &
RUSSO, supra note 3, at 26-27.
18. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Polk v. Cent.
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988)) (requiring "the state to
offer children with disabilities individualized education programs that provide more than a trivial
or de minimis educational benefit").
19. LARRY D. BARTLETr, SUSAN ETSCHEIDT & GREG R. WEISENSTEIN, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 67 (2d ed. 2007). Compare Deal v.
Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862, 864 (6th Cir. 2004) (interpreting the IDEA to
require a "meaningful educational benefit"), with Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455,
459-60 (6th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the IDEA to require only a basic level of educational benefits
for children with disabilities).
20. Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the Circuit Courts Defined a Free
Appropriate Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 7 (2005).
21. Id at 7-9; see infra Part L.B.2.
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disabilities receive different levels of education depending on where they live
in the United States. 22  To ensure that all students with disabilities receive
equal educational opportunities, an "appropriate" education under the IDEA
must be defined clearly.
This Comment recommends a resolution to the circuit split regarding what
constitutes an "appropriate" education. First, this Comment explores the IDEA
and Congress's intent when it passed the original law and subsequent
amendments. Next, it analyzes the Supreme Court's only holding on the issue
and the resulting circuit split. This Comment then describes the role that the
Supreme Court and Congress should have in resolving the split and highlights
their reluctance to address the issue for more than twenty years. Next, it
explores the role that an administrative agency can play in defining an
ambiguous term in a federal statute. Finally, this Comment proposes that the
U.S. Department of Education, in its role as the agency in charge of monitoring
and enforcing the IDEA, should, in the absence of congressional or judicial
action, issue a regulation defining the term "appropriate."
I. THE IDEA AND ITS REQUIREMENT FOR A FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC
EDUCATION
A. Federal Education Law and the IDEA
The Constitution of the United States creates a federalist system designed to
share power between the federal government and the states.23 Power and
control over education policy has traditionally been the purview of state and
24local governments. Although every state constitution mentions education to
25 2some degree, the U.S. Constitution makes no reference to education.26
22. See infra Part I.B.2.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (expressing the principle that the United States is a federal
system that limits the powers of the federal government to those that are enumerated and reserves
all other powers to the states or the people).
24. See Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J.
125, 130 (2006) ("The general proposition that states bear principal responsibility for education
policy provides initial form to the contours of education federalism in the United States.").
25. Id; Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1325, 1343-48 (1992) (providing a list of education provisions in the
constitutions of all fifty states). For example, the Constitution of Delaware states that "[tihe
General Assembly shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and efficient
system of free public schools." DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1. The Constitution of Illinois provides
that "[a] fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons
to the limits of their capacities. The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality
public educational institutions and services." ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. The Constitution of
Minnesota recognizes that because "[t]he stability of a republican form of government depend[s]
mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general
and uniform system of public schools." MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. Lastly, the Constitution of
Texas states that "[a] general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the
liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish
752 [Vol. 60:749
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1. Federal Power to Enact Education Law
Because the Constitution does not enumerate federal control over education,
this power is reserved to the states.27 Nevertheless, Congress has2 passed a
number of statutes that affect state educational policy and practice. These
statutes remain within constitutional bounds because Congress allocates
federal money for specific programs while maintaining conditions on how that
money may be spent.29 Under its taxing and spending power,30 Congress can
condition the receipt of federal funds upon compliance with federal statutory or
administrative directives, thereby ensuring the furtherance of broad policy
objectives.3 Although the federal government may incentivize or encourage
the states to implement its programs by offering funding, the government may
not coerce or compel the states to enact any federal policy.32 One prominent
example of congressional use of this authority is the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB), which conditions the receipt of federal funding on a state's
acceptance of federal educational policies and objectives.33
and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
schools." TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
26. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that there is no explicit or
implicit right to education in the U.S. Constitution); Heise, supra note 24, at 130.
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Supreme Court remarked that "[p]roviding public
schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972).
28. Heise, supra note 24, at 134 (discussing the federal government's involvement in
education policy through the enactment of specially focused statutes); see, e.g., Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006 & Supp. III 2009); Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6561 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
29. See Heise, supra note 24, at 134.
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.").
31. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987). In South Dakota v. Dole, the
Supreme Court explained that Congress's power to conditionally grant federal funds to further
policy objectives is not unlimited. Id. at 207. The spending power must be used "in pursuit of
'the general welfare,"' the conditions must be unequivocal and clear to the states, the grant must
be rationally related to a national interest or program, and there must be no conflict with other
constitutional provisions. Id. at 207-08.
32. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992) (holding that the
federal "take title" provision, either to accept ownership of waste or regulate it according to
Congress's instructions, presented the states with "two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory
techniques" and therefore exceeded Congress's authority).
33. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Heise, supra note 24, at 137. The goal of NCLB is to increase
student achievement for all and eliminate any disparities in achievement between different
student groups. Heise, supra note 24, at 126. One of the main conditions imposed by the federal
government, in return for funding, is that "states annually test all students in grades three through
eight in reading and math and demonstrate adequate progress each year." Id. at 137. Sanctions
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2. The History of the IDEA and a FAPE
Originally enacted as the EAHCA in 1975,34 the IDEA "responded to
increased awareness of the need to educate children with disabilities, and to
judicial decisions requiring that states provide an education for children with
disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities." 35
As a federal statute, the IDEA provides additional education funding to states
on the condition that recipients implement Congress's specific policies for
students with disabilities. 36 One of the main conditions for states to satisfy to
receive IDEA funds is that they must provide a FAPE to every child with a
disability between the ages of three and twenty-one. 37 Currently, every state
are placed on participating schools that do not demonstrate "adequate progress" as defined by the
statute. Id.
34. Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). The legislative
history of the EAHCA indicates that the impetus for enacting it was judicial decisions that
expanded the educational opportunities of children with disabilities, predominantly Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth and Mills v. Board of Education. NANCY LEE
JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. 95-669, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 3-4 (1995), available at http://ftp.fortunaty.net/
org/wikileaks/CRS/wikileaks-crs-reports/95-669.pdf In Pennsylvania Ass 'n for Retarded
Children, individuals with mental disabilities won the right to attend public school after the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had excluded them. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Similarly, in Mills, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the school district violated various laws by
withholding public education from individuals with disabilities. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972). The court found that "the United States Constitution, the District
of Columbia Code, and its own regulations required school officials to provide a publicly
supported education to all children, including those with disabilities." OSBORNE & RuSSo, supra
note 3, at 8. Furthermore, the "right of every child with a disability to be educated is grounded in
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Twenty-Five Years of Progress, supra note 5, at 3.
35. NANCY LEE JONES & RICHARD N. APLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22138, THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): OVERVIEW OF P.L. 108-446 1-2
(2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22138_20050505.pdf. Congress enacted
the EAHCA because numerous students with disabilities were not receiving a proper education in
public schools, often causing families to find education services for their children outside the
public-school system, and Congress believed that a proper public education was necessary for
students with disabilities to "stand a better chance of achieving their potential." YSSELDYKE &
ALGOZZINE, supra note 3, at 15-16. Legislators believed that "it was in the national interest to
fund programs to meet the needs of students who were disabled." Id at 16.
36. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411(a), (d), (e), 1412(a) (2006).
37. Id § 1412(a)(1)(A); RICHARD N. APLING & NANCY LEE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS 20366, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): OVERVIEW
OF MAJOR PROVISIONS 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/
marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS20366 0111 2002.pdf. To qualify for protection under the
statute, an individual must be between the ages of three and twenty-one and must also have a
specifically identified disability. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3)(A), 1412(a)(1)(A). Additionally, the
individual must need "special education and related services." Id § 1401(3)(A)(ii). A student
needs "special education and related services" if the student requires a specialized educational
754
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receives federal IDEA funding and, therefore, all states are bound by the
conditions of the statute.38
The statute defines a FAPE as
special education and related services that-
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program.39
Aside from this definition, Congress has not defined what constitutes an
"appropriate" education more specifically 40 despite having the opportunity to
do so in 1990, 1997, and 2004 when it amended the IDEA. Moreover,
plan to receive a FAPE in the "least restrictive environment" (LRE). OSBORNE & RUSSO, supra
note 3, at 9. These qualifying students are entitled to services related to their disabilities,
including "transportation, psychological services, physical services, and occupational therapy," to
help them maximize the benefits from their specialized educational plans. Id.
38. APLING & JONES, supra note 37, at 2 n.4; cf U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FUNDS FOR STATE
FORMULA-ALLOCATED AND SELECTED STUDENT AID PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION FUNDING (2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/1Istby
state.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FUNDING] (showing federal-education
funding levels for all states, including funds received for special education).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). An individualized educational program (IEP) is "a written
statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance
with [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)]." Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). The IEP includes, in part, "a statement of
the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, .. . a statement of
measurable annual goals, . . . a description of . .. the child's progress toward meeting the annual
goals . . . [, and] a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids
and services." Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(IV). The IEP "is the product of a thorough evaluation"
with instructional goals that "must be measurable, observable, and based on performance."
YSSELDYKE & ALGOZZINE, supra note 3, at 17. An IEP is used because it is "a mechanism to
keep track of a student's progress" and because "students would benefit more from their
education if school personnel had specific objectives .. . and a method for evaluating the extent to
which the student was meeting individual goals." Id. at 20. Parents are also intimately involved
with their child's IEP and have the opportunity to question or challenge the plan. Id at 21.
40. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006 & Supp. Ill 2009) (failing to include a definition of
"appropriate" within the definition section of the IDEA).
41. CHARLES J. Russo & ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND
SCHOOL-BASED CASES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 12-13 (2008). In 1990, the EAHCA was
renamed the IDEA. Id at 12. Beyond the name change, the 1990 amendments made significant
changes, such as making the IDEA "permanent legislation, while previous laws expired unless
they were reauthorized." Id. at 13. The IDEA was next amended in 1997, and those amendments
incorporated "major changes" into the law, including the addition of disciplinary procedures.
OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 3, at 9; RUSSO & OSBORNE, supra, at 13; President Bill Clinton,
Statement on Signing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 (June
4, 1997), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid-54222 (describing the 1997
amendments to the IDEA). President Clinton described these changes, in part, as placing a
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Congress authorized the Department of Education to enforce the IDEA by
issuing rules and regulations that have the full force of law.42 In its IDEA
regulations issued to date, the Department of Education has provided no
further clarification on the definition of an "appropriate" education.43 Because
of the silence of Congress and the Department of Education, educators must
rely on judicial inte retations of an "appropriate" education to understand the
meaning of the law.
B. Judicial Decisions Interpreting What Constitutes an "Appropriate"
Education
Although Congress sought to ensure that every child with a disability
received more than a nominal education,45 courts have interpreted the FAPE
provisions of the IDEA to require varying educational standards.46 These
inconsistent judicial interpretations stem from Con ress's reluctance to provide
a clear definition of an "appropriate" education and the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to provide a definitive interpretation.48 In the absence of clear
guidance, some federal courts have concluded that an appropriate education for
students with disabilities need only provide "some" minimal educational
benefits, while other courts have mandated that an appropriate education
provide more substantive "meaningful" educational benefits.49
focus on improving educational results for these children through greater access to the
general curriculum and inclusion in State and district wide assessments; giving parents
more information, including regular reports on their children's progress, and a greater
role in decisions affecting their children's education; [and] reducing paperwork and
increasing administrative flexibility.
Clinton, supra. The most recent amendment to the IDEA occurred in 2004 with the passage of
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act. Russo & OSBORNE, supra, at 13.
This legislation "modified the 1997 disciplinary provisions and brought the IDEA in line with
other federal legislation." Id.
42. See 20 U.S.C. § 122 1e-3 (authorizing the Secretary of Education and the Department of
Education to promulgate rules and regulations); Id § 1406 (limiting the Secretary of Education's
regulation-issuing authority to situations where such regulations are necessary).
43. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool
Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,541 (Aug. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.idea.ed.gov/download/finalregulations.pdf (amending regulations in light of changes
in the 2004 IDEA without specifically defining an "appropriate" education); NANCY LEE JONES
& ANN LORDEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40055, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT: FINAL PART B REGULATIONS (2008), available at http://digital
commons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1573&context-keyworkplace (explaining
the Department of Education's December 1, 2008 regulations, which fail to define "appropriate"
education under the IDEA).
44. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187 (1982).
45. See infra Part l1l.B.2.
46. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 3, at 26-28.
47. See id. at 25; supra Part I.A.2.
48. See infra Part I.B.3.
49. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 3, at 26-28.
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1. The Rowley Standard for an Appropriate Education
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Board of Education v. Rowley ex rel.
Rowley in an initial attempt to define the contours of an appropriate education
under the 1982 version of the IDEA.50 Amy Rowley was a deaf, intelligent,
and "well-adjusted" kindergarten student who requested a sign-language
interpreter to understand her teachers and classmates better.51 The local school
district refused the request because Rowley's scholastic P2rogress was similar
to, and even exceeded that of, other children in her class. The district court,
however, found that although Rowley performed well in school, an interpreter
would allow her to reach her full academic potential because she would be able
to understand everything said in class rather than just a fraction.53 Thus, the
district court interpreted an "appropriate" education to require that "each
handicapped child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children."54
The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the IDEA as an attempt by
Congress, ?rimarily, to make public education available for students with
disabilities. In creating the statute, Congress "did not impose upon the States
any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make
such access [to the school] meaningful."56  The Court went on to note that,
based on the language and legislative history of the 1982 statute, an
appropriate education is one that provides "some" educational benefit to the
disabled student.57  The Court held that Amy Rowley's education plan
provided her with an adequate education even without an interpreter, and
therefore complied with the statute.
50. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186-87 (1982). Some
commentators noted that the Supreme Court decision "may seem cold-hearted ... [but because it
sets] a limit on public responsibility, it furthers fair education policy." Editorial, How Much for
the Handicapped?, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1982, at A20. Others viewed the decision in a less
positive light, describing it as a "psychological blow to forces seeking to improve the education
of handicapped youngsters." Edward B. Fiske, Setback for the Handicapped, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 1982, at B2. Despite conflicting views about its effects, the Rowley decision did not
substantially affect the basic structure of the EACHA. Id.
51. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184-85 (quoting Rowley ex rel. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F.
Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), rev'd, 458 U.S.
176 (1982)).
52. Id
53. Id; see Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 532 (noting that Rowley performed better on
standardized tests administered in sign language and that she could likely understand only
fifty-nine percent of what was said in class without an interpreter).
54. Rowley, 483 F. Supp at 534.
55. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. In Rowley, the Supreme Court interpreted the language and
intent of the EAHCA, the precursor to the IDEA. Id. at 179.
56. Id. at 192.
57. Id. at 195.
58. Id. at 209-10. Justice Harry Blackmun stated that the legislative history of the EAHCA
indicated a congressional intent to provide children with disabilities an "equal educational
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2. The Circuit Court Split: Varying Judicial Standards Have Emerged to
Assess the Meaning of "Appropriate Education"
In the years following Rowley, lower federal courts have struggled to define
coherently an appropriate standard for judging the education plans of disabled
students. A circuit split has emerged as the judiciary has attempted to quantify
the level of benefits necessary to satisfy the vague Rowley test, which
mandates only that "some" benefit is necessary.59 The Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted a heightened, meaningful-
educational-benefit standard to determine what constitutes an appropriate
education.60 In contrast, the First, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits
opportunity." Id at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975),
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433). Applying this standard, Justice Blackmun
concluded, as did the majority, that Amy Rowley's education plan satisfied the statutory
requirements without the addition of an interpreter. Id. at 211-12. The dissent, authored by
Justice Byron White and joined by Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall,
argued that the legislative history of the EAHCA reflected an intent to provide children with
disabilities "educational opportunity commensurate" with the education given to children without
disabilities. Id. at 214 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that some legislators had gone
so far as to state that an appropriate education would allow a student with disabilities "to achieve
his or her maximum potential." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 13, 19 (1975)). Thus, the
dissent argued for a more rigorous standard by which to judge what constitutes an "appropriate"
education than did the majority and would have upheld the Second Circuit's decision requiring
access to an interpreter. Id at 214-15, 218.
59. See NANCY LEE JONES & CAROL J. TOLAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33444, THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 3
(2010), available at http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL33444/20 10-01-11/download/1005/
(explaining that lower courts have attempted to adhere to Rowley, but the resulting interpretations
have differed vastly). Several circuits have interpreted Rowley narrowly, holding that minimal
educational progress is sufficient if the FAPE procedural requirements are satisfied, while other
circuits have interpreted the decision expansively, requiring school districts to provide
meaningful educational benefits. Id.
60. See D.S. ex rel D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999)); P ex rel. P v.
Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Walczak v. Fla. Union Free
Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998)); N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d
1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1145 (4th Cit. 1999));
Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 (6th Cir. 2004); A.B. ex rel.
D.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cit. 2004) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192); Hous. Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. ex rel. Barry F., 118 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cit. 1997), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1892 (2010); see also Aron, supra note 20, at 7 & n.40. The Fourth Circuit appears to follow
a weakened version of the meaningful-educational-benefit standard. See Lawson, 354 F.3d at
319; Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985); see also
Melissa R. Murray, Note, Should Behavior Outside ofSchool Factor into a Court's Evaluation of
Free Appropriate Public Education?, 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 267, 276 & n.60, 277
(2010) (comparing earlier Fourth Circuit cases that require a more rigorous standard of education
under the IDEA with later cases that more closely resemble the some-educational-benefit
standard). Murray calls particular attention to Lawson, which stated that the IDEA requires
meaningful access to public education while simultaneously stating that an appropriate education
need not be potential-maximizing and need only confer "some" benefits. See Murray, supra, at
276-77 (citing Lawson, 354 F.3d at 319).
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apply the less rigorous some-educational-benefit standard.61  The Seventh
circuit applies "a mixture of the two." 62
a. Meaningful-Educational-Benefit Standard
Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16 provides an example of
63the majority meaningful-educational-benefit standard. The Third Circuit
interpreted Rowley as limited to the facts specific to Amy Rowley: an
intelligent child who performed comparably to her peers.64 In Polk,
Christopher, a student with mental retardation and encephalopathy, a severe
brain disease similar to cerebral palsy, required physical therapy as part of his
educational program.65 Although the Polk family argued that Christopher
needed direct "hands on" therapy from a licensed therapist to provide him with
an educational benefit, the school district instead provided therapy given by his
teacher.66
In evaluating how the Rowley decision applied to the case, the Third Circuit
67held that a "meaningful benefit" was necessary under the IDEA. According
to the court, because the holding in Rowley was narrow and limited to its facts,
the Supreme Court did not articulate a broad rule regarding educational
standards for all cases brought under the IDEA.68 Due to the narrow holding in
61. See Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray ex rel. Gray, 611 F.3d 419, 427 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citing Blackmon ex rel. Blackmon v. Springfield R. XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir.
1999)); Thompson R2-J. Sch. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200); Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d
18, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Me. Admin. Sch. Dist. No. 35 v. R. ex rel. R., 321 F.3d 9, 11
(1st Cir. 2003)); CP v. Leon Cnty. Sch. Bd., 483 F.3d 1151, 1153 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200); Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200); see also Aron, supra note 20, at 7 & n.41.
62. Aron, supra note 20, at 7 & n.42; see also infra Part 1.B.2.c. (discussing Alex R. ex rel.
Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2004)).
63. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 171 (3d Cir. 1988); see
Murray, supra note 60, at 274-75 (noting that "the Third Circuit was one of the first appellate
courts to explore the 'meaningful benefit' standard").
64. Polk, 853 F.2d at 180 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202).
65. Id. at 173-74. The court also noted that "Christopher Polk is severely developmentally
disabled . . . [and] [a]lthough Christopher is fourteen years old, he has the functional and mental
capacity of a toddler." Id. at 173.
66. Id at 173-74.
67. Id. at 184.
68. Id at 180 ("Rowley was an avowedly narrow opinion that relied significantly on the fact
that Amy Rowley progressed successfully from grade to grade in a 'mainstreamed' classroom.
The [Supreme] Court self-consciously limited its opinion to the facts before it . . . ."). The Polk
Court noted the attention that the Supreme Court gave to the term "meaningful" when describing
educational benefit in Rowley, which the court believed reinforced the term's significance. Id at
179 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192). Thus, according to the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court
considered the outcome of Rowley to be narrowly tailored for Amy Rowley's situation and not the
standard for the benefit that Congress intended for all children with disabilities. Id. at 180
("[T]he facts of the case (including Amy Rowley's quite substantial benefit from her education)
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Rowley, the Third Circuit turned to the statute and legislative history.69 In
doing so, the court found that Congress, by enacting the statute, espoused an
"intent to afford more than a trivial amount of educational benefit" through the
Act. 70  Thus, the Third Circuit adopted a standard in which the educational
benefit a student with disabilities receives under the IDEA must be
meaningful.71
b. Some-Educational-Benefit Standard
A minority of circuits has declined to adopt a heightened-educational-benefit
standard, applying instead the some-educational-benefit standard to all
educational-benefit cases.72  The First Circuit's decision in Lessard v.
Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School District illustrates this standard.73
The parents of Stephanie Lessard, a student with "moderate mental retardation
. . . and partial Xaralysis of her left side," sued the school district over their
daughter's IEP. The Lessard family argued that the 1997 amendments to the
IDEA superseded the some-educational-benefit standard espoused in Rowley. 5
The court rejected this arg'ment and held that Rowley was still good law
despite Congress's actions. Under the First Circuit standard, an IEP must
did not force the court to confront squarely the fact that Congress cared about the quality of
special education.").
69. Id. at 181-82.
70. Id.
71. Id at 184; accord Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 248
(5th Cir. 1997) (applying the meaningful-educational-benefit standard). The Fifth Circuit
provided four factors to determine whether an IEP confers a meaningful educational benefit: "(1)
the program is individualized on the basis of the student's assessment and performance; (2) the
program is administered in the least restrictive environment; (3) the services are provided in a
coordinated and collaborative manner by the key 'stakeholders'; and (4) positive academic and
non-academic benefits are demonstrated." Id. at 253.
72. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Blau, supra note 14, at 11-12, 19
(discussing court usage of the some-educational-benefit standard and providing a chart of varying
court interpretations of the Rowley standard). Even though a number of courts have followed the
Rowley standard, there is no uniform agreement on how that standard should be applied. Blau,
supra note 14, at 11. After the Rowley decision, "state, district, and circuit courts . . . have
attempted to define 'appropriate' education with little consistency or uniformity." Id. The
standard has been interpreted "both narrowly and more broadly" with each court's determination
of an appropriate education generally "based on a continuum of interpretations of the Rowley
standard." Id. at 11-12.
73. Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2008).
74. Id at 21-22. The Lessards contended that the IEP did not provide "adequate literacy,
transition, or behavioral services." Id at 25.
75. Id. at 27-28.
76. Id. In rejecting the claim that the 1997 amendments to the IDEA superseded the Rowley
standard, the court stated that the Lessards' argument "had no support in the text of the
amendments and that no other court of appeals, post-1997, had exhibited a willingness to scuttle
the Rowley standard." Id. at 28. In a previous First Circuit opinion, the court similarly rejected
an argument that the 1997 amendments overruled Rowley by requiring that schools provide
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"only supply 'some educational benefit,' not an optimal or an ideal level of
educational benefit, in order to survive judicial scrutiny." 77  Using this
standard, the court held that Lessard's IEP provided some educational benefit,
and, therefore, the school district complied with the IDEA.78
c. Seventh Circuit Standard: A Hybrid Approach
In Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Community Unit School
District #221, the Seventh Circuit used a mix of the some-educational-benefit
and meaningful-educational-benefit standards to determine an appropriate
education for Alex R., a student with disabilities.79 Alex's mother challenged
her son's placement in a special classroom as a denial of a FAPE.8 0  The
Seventh Circuit initially espoused a meaningful-educational-benefit standard
with regard to whether Alex received an appropriate education. However, in
that same decision, the court seemed to use the some-educational-benefit
standard as a gauge to determine whether Alex received a FAPE.82 These
inconsistencies make it difficult to determine the Seventh Circuit's position for
new cases regarding a FAPE and suggest that the court will use a hybrid of the
two standards.83
students with disabilities the maximum educational benefit possible. L.T. ex rel. N.B. v.
Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004).
77. Lessard, 518 F.3d at 23-24.
78. Id. at 30-31; accord Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.
1997) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 195, 203 (1982) (stating that
the IDEA requires only that a school provide enough service so that the student can benefit from
the education). In Clynes, the Eighth Circuit noted that the purpose of IDEA is to provide access
and confer some educational benefit to students with disabilities. Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at
192, 195). Therefore, although Nicolas Clynes's reading test scores were between the second and
ninth percentile, the court held that he was provided a FAPE because he had access to public
education and received passing grades in school. Id. at 612-13.
79. See Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d
603, 612, 615 (7th Cir. 2004).
80. Id at 609-10.
81. Id at 612. The court initially stated that Alex R.'s argument that an appropriate
education depends on "whether the school district appropriately addressed the child's needs and
provided him with a meaningful educational benefit under the substantive prong of
Rowley ... [was] basically true in cases where the validity of the IEP is in question." Id
82. Id. at 615. The court also stated, contrary to the meaningful-educational-benefit
standard, that "[u]nder Rowley, 'while one might demand only minimal results in the case of the
most severely handicapped children, such results would be insufficient in the case of other
children."' Id. (quoting Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir.
1985)).
83. See Aron, supra note 20, at 19-20.
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3. Further Supreme Court Special-Education Decisions
Although the existence of a circuit split is usually an ideal opportunity for
the Supreme Court to offer a definitive interpretation of a statute,84 the Court
has not revisited the definition of an appropriate education since Rowley in
1982.5 The reluctance of the Court to return to this issue is not because of a
lack of opportunity. 8 The Court has heard a number of special-education
cases in recent years dealing with the issue of a FAPE.87
The Supreme Court, for example, declined to hear the Alex R. case in 2004,
even though the Seventh Circuit's opinion furthered the circuit split by
introducing the hybrid standard for analyzing appropriate educational
benefits. Moreover, in Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School
District, a 2007 special-education case, the Court defined an appropriate
education under the IDEA based on the Rowley precedent without
acknowledging the ongoing circuit split.89 Other recent Supreme Court cases
regarding the IDEA and special education, including Schaffer v. Weast and
Forest Grove School District v. T.A., have also provided opportunities for the
Court to revisit the definition of an "appropriate" education which the Court
has declined. 90
Although the Court did not resolve the circuit split in Schaffer, it did
reiterate that the structure of the IDEA is one of "cooperative federalism."9'
This means that the federal government "imposes significant requirements to
be followed [by the states]" but gives the states "the primary responsibility for
developing and executing educational programs for handicapped children." 92
Under this structure, the states retain the ultimate power to control education in
their state.93 However, if a state chooses to accept federal funding for special
84. See H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 251 (1991). A circuit split is "probably the single most important criterion" for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and hear a case. Id The Supreme Court has further stated,
in a case involving a dispute between the Second and Sixth Circuits, that the "clash of opinion [of
the circuit courts] obviously required settlement by this Court." Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 476 (1951).
85. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2494-95 (2009); Winkelman ex
rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2007); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer
v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005); Alex R., 375 F.3d at 612-13.
86. See cases cited supra note 85.
87. See cases cited supra note 85.
88. See Alex R., 375 F.3d at 612-13, 615.
89. See Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 524-25.
90. See Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2494-95; Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53.
91. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52 (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830
(8th Cir. 1999)).
92. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982)).
93. See id
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education under the IDEA, then the federal government may impose
requirements and conditions on receipt of federal dollars. 94
C. Administrative Law Concerning the Scope ofAgency Regulations
In passing a statute, such as the IDEA, Congress may delegate some of its
legislative authority to an administrative agency to promulgate rules and
regulations regarding that statute.95 Congress gives agencies this power for a
variety of different reasons, including the expertise of the staff and the desire
of Congress to fill in any statutory gaps in the legislation by building "upon the
legislative infrastructure Congress erected." 96  Congress will also typically
delegate the ability to make major policy determinations to an administrative
agency because members of Congress are often unable to agree on a proper
outcome for such decisions.9 7
When Congress delegates this law-making authority, a "reviewing court
must accord 'legislative effect' to the standards promulgated by the agency." 98
Congress has assigned the Department of Education as the administrative
agency required to enforce the IDEA. 99  As a result, the Department of
Education has the responsibility to issue rules and regulations for the IDEA.'00
In 1984, the Supreme Court addressed how to determine the level of
deference that a court must give to an agency's construction of a statute that
the agency is charged with administering. o1 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, Inc., the Court created a two-step test to determine
94. Id at 52-53.
95. See Robert J. Gregory, When a Delegation Is Not a Delegation: Using Legislative
Meaning to Define Statutory Gaps, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 725, 726 (1990) ("Congress routinely
delegates rulemaking power to agencies, thereby inviting agencies to act in a legislative capacity
and to promulgate standards when implementing a statutory scheme.").
96. Id. at 732. Although Congress may delegate some of its power to an agency to fill in the
gaps of legislation, Congress "may also specifically indicate what puzzle pieces the agency
cannot use and maybe some, or even many, of the pieces the agency must use." Id. at 726.
97. See KRISTEN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 514 (2010) ("Congress typically delegates the policy decisions inherent
in major rulemakings to agencies because a majority of members of the House and Senate are
unable to agree with respect to the resolution of those policy disputes.").
98. Gregory, supra note 95, at 725.
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2006). The statute states that "the Secretary [of Education] shall
issue regulations under this chapter [20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482] only to the extent that such
regulations are necessary to ensure that there is compliance with the specific requirements of this
chapter." Id
100. See id.; Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540 (Aug. 14, 2006) (showing
regulations issued under the IDEA). The Secretary of Education is further granted the authority,
by Congress, "to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing the
manner of operation of, and governing the applicable programs administered by, the
Department." 20 U.S.C. § 122 1e-3.
101. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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if the agency should be given deference.102 First, the reviewing court must
determine whether Congress has spoken on the precise issue at hand. 03  If
congressional intent "is clear [regarding that issue], that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."l 0 4 When the will of Congress is
clear, it is unnecessary to move onto the second step of the Chevron
analysis. 05
If the will of Congress is not clear and the administrative agency has made a
determination, then a reviewing court must move to the second step of the
analysis.' 06 Under this step, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue," the only issue the court must determine is whether the
agency's construction is "based on a permissible construction of the statute."'0 7
Therefore, courts should give significant weight and deference to an agency
construction or interpretation of a law that the agency is charged with
administering, and courts should only disturb the ruling of an administrative
agency if it is evidently contrary to the will of Congress.
This presumption is so strong that, in the case of National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Court held that
deference to an administrative agency's statutory interpretation extends to
cases where that interpretation contradicts an earlier judicial precedent.' 09
Unless a court expressly states that the statute does not permit an agency to
provide such an interpretation or fill a gap, the decision of the agency receives
deference.I 0 An administrative agency is also free to change its decision or
interpretation, if adequately justified."'
Under its authority to enforce and monitor the IDEA,112 the
Department of Education has promulgated a number of rules and
102. Id. at 842-43.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 842, 843 & n.9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent.").
106. Id. at 842-43.
107. Id at 843.
108. Id. at 844-45.
109. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005).
110. Id. at 982-83. Under this precedent, "[w]here a politically accountable body uses
transparent, deliberative means to adopt a reasonable interpretation of a law it administers, the
courts should defer to this interpretation, regardless of whether it contradicts judicial precedent."
Richard Murphy, The BrandX Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1247, 1251.
111. See BrandX Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 1001.
112. See 20 U.S.C. §1402(a) (2006).
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regulations.113 Even when the Department of Education's interpretation of the
IDEA was not in a formal regulation, the Court has shown deference. 114 For
example, in Honig v. Doe, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict over the
meaning of the IDEA term "change in placement," which Congress had not
defined.' 15 The Court explained that, given this ambiguity in the IDEA, it
would "defer to the construction adopted by the agency charged with
monitoring and enforcing the statute." 1  In this instance, the Department of
Education's construction of a provision in the IDEA was accepted and utilized
by the Court.1 17
The Department of Education has also issued rules and regulations for the
education of students with disabilities under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.118 The Rehabilitation Act is a federal civil rights law designed to protect
the rights of people with disabilities. 19 Section 504 protects the educational
rights of and provides an appropriate education for students with disabilities.120
Under the Department of Education's regulations for this statute, the
Department defines an appropriate education, in part, as education services
"designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as
adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met."'121  The
Department of Education has chosen to use its authority to promulgate
113. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool
Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540 (Aug. 14, 2006) (codified at 34 C.F.R.
pts 300-301.




118. 34 C.F.R. § 104.1 (2010).
119. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 3, at 10. The Rehabilitation Act broadly applies to
prevent discrimination against persons with disabilities for all programs, including state
programs, that receive federal funding, whereas the IDEA focuses on providing an appropriate
public education to persons with disabilities. See Mark H. ex rel. Michelle H. v. Lemahieu, 513
F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2008). Section 504 states that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (2006). Although the two statutes are similar in application to education for disabled
people, there are differences between them. Mark H., 513 F.3d at 933; see also Thomas F.
Guernsey, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Statutory Interaction Following the Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986, 68 NEB. L. REv. 564, 565-70 (1989) (discussing the differences between
§ 504 and the predecessor to the IDEA). In general, § 504 covers a broader class of disabilities
than are covered by the IDEA. See Michael L. Perlin, "Simplify You, Classify You": Stigma,
Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 607, 633
n.l 13 (2009).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b).
121. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33.
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regulations defining an appropriate education with regard to § 504.122 For the
IDEA, however, the regulations do not provide any guidance on the meaning
of "appropriate" education.123
II. ACTIONS BY CONGRESS OR THE SUPREME COURT COULD RESOLVE THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT, BUT NO SUCH ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN
Although Congress wrote and passed the provisions of the IDEAl24 and the
Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the law,125 neither
branch has provided a clear and specific definition of an "appropriate"
education under the IDEA.126 The inaction of Congress and the Court,
arguably the most appropriate venues to issue a definitive resolution of the
meaning of a FAPE, places the burden of resolving this issue on other
shoulders. This void should be filled by the Department of Education, an
agency with the authority to promulgate a definition for a FAPE in accordance
with congressional intent under the statute.' 27
A. Lack of Congressional Action Regarding the Definition of an Appropriate
Education
When Congress passed the EAHCA in 1975, it failed to provide a
comprehensive definition for a FAPE, and several amendments since then have
failed to correct the deficiency.128 Taking into account the differing judicial
interpretations of an appropriate education since Rowley, Congress could have
resolved the circuit split by clearly articulating its intent in any of the
amendments to the IDEA.129 The 2004 amendments, for example, addressed a
myriad of issues related to special education, such as behavior, the proper
identification of children with disabilities, and a reduction in administrative
paperwork.130 These changes were passed "without ill will, partisan shouting
and layers of added pork" and with a vast majority of representatives from both
political parties supporting the legislation.131 Considering the bipartisan
122. See id.
123. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006) (containing essentially the same language), with
34 C.F.R. § 300.17 (2010)
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1400.
125. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
126. See supra Part L.A-B. Congress's lack of clarity and specificity in defining an
"appropriate" education and the Supreme Court's lack of clarity in its interpretation of the law has
led to a plethora of differing interpretations and standards on this issue. See supra Part I.B.
127. See supra Part I.C.
128. See supra Part I.A.2.
129. See supra Part I.B.
130. Congress Backs Special-Ed Changes: Discipline Issues, Parent Disputes and
Paperwork Addressed, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2004, at A5 [hereinafter Congress Backs
Special-Ed Changes].
131. Editorial, Making Progress, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2004, at A28. The 2004
amendments passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 397 to 3 and passed the Senate by
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support for the amendments, as well as the numerous substantial changes to the
IDEA in previous amendments, Congress could have written a more specific
definition for a FAPE had it so desired. Congress's lack of action suggests that
the definition of an "appropriate" education will not be addressed in the near
future and makes it necessary to examine alternative avenues for ensuring a
meaningful education for students with disabilities.
B. Lack ofSupreme Court Action Regarding the Definition ofan
"Appropriate" Education
The role of the judiciary in interpreting the "appropriate" education
provision of the IDEA is heightened because both the legislative language and
its regulations fail to provide a substantive definition.132  Although the
Supreme Court interpreted "appropriate" education in Rowley, the issue is still
subject to debate within the circuits because of the breadth and scope of the
Court's interpretation.133 This ambiguity has fostered a split with regard to the
proper meaning and interpretation of the Rowley decision within the circuits.134
Although the Supreme Court had a number of opportunities to resolve the
split in the many special-education cases before it in recent years, it has not
addressed the issue of "appropriate" education since Rowley. 35 By declining
to clarify this issue in the cases decided within in the last twenty years,
including Schaffer, Forest Grove School District, and Winkelman,136 it seems
unlikely that the Court will resolve the circuit split in the near future.
C. The Department ofEducation Has the Potential to Resolve the Circuit Split
Under the IDEA, Congress delegated the power to enforce and monitor the
statute to the Department of Education.'3 7 Under the standard articulated in
a voice vote. Congress Backs Special-Ed Changes, supra note 130. Republican Representative
John Boehner, then-Chairman of the Education and Workforce Committee, stated, "We set out
with one fundamental goal in mind . . . to improve the educational results for students with
disabilities, and I believe we have accomplished that goal with the bill that we have before us
today." Id. Similarly, Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy stated, "In many respects, [the 2004
IDEA amendment is] one of the most important undertakings and success stories of this
Congress." Id
132. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 3, at 25 ("Since neither the IDEA nor its regulations
include a precise definition of the term 'appropriate,' it is necessary to turn to judicial
interpretation for further guidance on the meaning of FAPE.").
133. See supra Part lB.
134. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
135. See Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law,
2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J., 561, 584-85 ("[Rowley] has provided the basic framework for special
education services for the last 20 years.").
136. See cases cited supra note 85.
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2006) (creating an Office of Special Education Programs
within the Department of Education tasked with administering and carrying out the statute and
other functions related to the education of children with disabilities); id. § 1406(d) (defining the
scope of the Department of Education's power to issue regulations under the IDEA); 34 C.F.R.
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Chevron, a court must defer to a reasonable interpretation of an administrative
agency if Congress has not precisely spoken on the issue and the statute is
silent or ambiguous on that issue.'38  Therefore, an interpretation from the
Department of Education will be given deference by the courts in future
adjudications, provided it meets the Chevron requirements.139
Under the first step of Chevron, the language of the IDEA reveals that
Congress has not defined "appropriate" education precisely.14 0  Congress
provided only four vague provisions for an appropriate education, but did not
actually define the term "appropriate."l41 Thus, under the Chevron analysis,
the language used regarding a FAPE is ambiguous. The lower courts that have
arrived at numerous interpretations construing the same provisions simply
prove the ambiguity of the term in the IDEA.142 Therefore, a reasonable
interpretation of the term "appropriate" by the Department of Education should
be given deference.
Even if courts have arrived at a different interpretation of a statute, an
agency's construction of a statute is still entitled to deference as long as
judicial precedent has not held that the statute can only be interpreted in one
way. 143 Under the Brand X decision, because there is no judicial precedent
finding the IDEA to be unambiguous, courts must give deference to a
Department of Education regulation or interpretation regarding a FAPE
regardless of prior precedent.144 Using this power and authority, the
Department of Education could interpret the FAPE provision of the IDEA to
pts. 300-301 (2010) (encompassing regulations by the Department of Education regarding the
education of children with disabilities).
138. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
139. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988) (deferring to a Department of
Education policy that a short-term student suspension does not constitute a "change of placement"
when the statute had not defined "change of placement").
140. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); Murray, supra note 60, at 271 (noting that the statute
addresses the procedural elements of a FAPE but does not define "appropriate").
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
142. See supra Part I.B.
143. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83
(2005) ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.").
144. See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 27-28 (1st
Cir. 2008) (providing an example of a circuit court decision that relied on precedent but did not
explicitly preclude a Department of Education regulation); Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
249 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (providing another example of a circuit court decision that
did not preclude a Department of Education regulation). Moreover, the Supreme Court has not
only held that the Department of Education has the authority to issue interpretations under the
IDEA, but has deferred to the Department's explanation for such interpretations. Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988).
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promulgate a uniform standard for an "appropriate" education, which would be
given deference in courts throughout the country when deciding IDEA cases.
III. THE APPROPRIATE-EDUCATION STANDARD UNDER THE IDEA SHOULD BE
A MEANINGFUL-EDUCATIONAL-BENEFIT STANDARD AS DEFINED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
The varying circuit court interpretations of what constitutes an appropriate
education under the IDEA means that divergent standards of education exist
for students depending on their geographic location.145 Along with claims of
unfairness and inequity, differing educational standards encourage costly
litigationl46 and frustrate the legislative purpose of the IDEA.147 Therefore,
because a national standard is superior to a circuit split, the Department of
Education should define "appropriate" education as one that provides a
meaningful education to students with disabilities, which is the interpretation
that most closely aligns with Congressional intent.
A. A National Standard for an Appropriate Education Is More Beneficial Than
the Current Split
Although education policy has traditionally remained the sole province of
individual states, and has continued to remain the responsibility of the states,
all fifty states have chosen to accept the conditions imposed by the IDEA in
return for federal special-education funding. 148  If states decide to accept
federal money for special education, which is likely since they always need
more resources for special education, 149  the states must abide by
congressionally imposed conditions.150  As the Supreme Court stated in
Schaffer, the IDEA is a "model of cooperative federalism" because the federal
government sets the conditions-here an unclear definition of an appropriate
education-with which the states must comply in order to be eligible for
funding.151 In this way, a state choosing to be bound by federal legislation
should have the benefit of a single standard instead of having to comply with
145. See supra Part I.B.
146. Blau, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that the money and energy funneled into IDEA
litigation would be better spent on the education itself).
147. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2006). Congress spoke of every child with a disability
throughout the United States as having the same FAPE standard when it declared that one of the
purposes of the IDEA was "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a
free appropriate public education." Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
148. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir. 1999) (explaining that
a state is free to participate in the IDEA and accept its conditions or decline participation); 34
C.F.R. § 104.3 (2010) (requiring states that receive federal education funding to provide a FAPE
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FUNDING, supra note
38 (showing that all fifty states receive IDEA funding).
149. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FUNDING, supra note 38.
150. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005).
151. Id (quoting Mauney, 183 F.3d at 830) (internal quotations omitted).
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the decisions of the different circuit courts. Along with the procedural and
substantive requirements of the IDEA, states must comply with oversight
requirements to ensure that the federal money is spent properly.152 These
oversight requirements provide an additional reason why a national standard
should be instituted-so that the federal government may properly perform its
oversight duties and ensure that states are actually providing an appropriate
education.1 53  Without a clear national standard, federal oversight
responsibilities are made increasingly difficult or even impossible to perform
adequately.
While states'-rights advocates would argue that individual states should
control their own educational policy, this argument does not apply to the
IDEA. Under the IDEA, an individual state still retains the ultimate control
over its educational system when it chooses to opt into the federal
requirements to receive IDEA funding. 154  Even if states choose to accept
IDEA funding, however, those states still continue to control the day-to-day
implementation of education within the confines of broad federal policies.155
Another disadvantage fostered by the uncertainty of the current circuit split
is increased litigation by parents and school systems.156  Without a clear
standard for an "appropriate" education, there will be continuous litigation
regarding what constitutes the correct standard.157  These court actions are
costly, both in terms of money and energy, and their frequency can be at least
partially blamed on a lack of clarity in the meaning of an "appropriate"
education.
152. See 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (describing the Secretary of Education's oversight requirements).
153. See id. § 1416(a)(3)(A) (noting that the first state-monitoring priority for the Secretary
of Education is to ensure that students with disabilities are provided "a free appropriate public
education in the least restrictive environment").
154. See ANN LORDEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32085, INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT (IDEA): CURRENT FUNDING TRENDS 1 (2008), available at http://stuff.mit
.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL32085.pdf ("As a condition of
accepting IDEA funding, the act requires that states and local educational agencies (LEAs)
provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to each eligible child with a disability.");
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Overview, NEW AM. FOUND., http://febp.new
america.net/background-analysis/individuals-disabilities-education-act-overview (last visited
Mar. 28, 2011) ("States that receive federal funds are required to provide a 'free, appropriate
public education' to all children with disabilities in the 'least restrictive environment."').
155. Mauney, 183 F.3d at 830 ("[A]uthority is vested in state and local bodies to effectuate
the [IDEA's] substantive and procedural guarantees.").
156. Blau, supra note 14, at 6, I1.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id
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B. In the Absence of Congressional or Supreme Court Action, the Department
of Education Should Define an "Appropriate" Education with a Heightened
Standard
Aside from Congress or the Supreme Court, the Department of Education is
in the best position to promulgate a national standard for an "appropriate"
education. The Department has already issued numerous rules and
regulations for the IDEA, including providing definitions for other terms left
ambiguous by the statute.160
1. The Meaningful-Educational-Benefit Standard Is Consistent with Prior
Department ofEducation FAPE Regulations
The Department of Education has already defined an "appropriate"
education in its regulations implementing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.161 Section 504, which prohibits discrimination based on disability under
programs or activities that receive federal funding, does not define an
appropriate education.162 The Department of Education, however, interpreted
an appropriate education under § 504 as "meet[ing] [the] individual
educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of
nonhandicapped persons."l 63 This construction is designed both to provide a
meaningful benefit to and meet the potential of students with disabilities.'6
The Department of Education regulation is also in line with Congress's
national education policy that "every citizen is entitled to an education to meet
his or her full potential."1 65
By providing that the needs of students with disabilities must be met as
adequately as those of students without disabilities, the Department of
Education regulation essentially means that all students must be educated to
their full potential under § 504. Consequently, this construction of an
appropriate education under § 504 is most analogous to the
meaningful-educational-benefit standard followed by the majority of circuits in
159. See supra Part II.C.
160. See, e.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540 (Aug. 14, 2006) (codified at
34 C.F.R. pts. 300-301); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988) (showing the
Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the Department of Education's interpretation of the term
"change in placement" with regard to fixed suspensions, which had been left unclear by the
statute).
161. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2010).
162. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
163. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33.
164. See Philip T.K. Daniel & Jill Meinhardt, Valuing the Education of Students with
Disabilities: Has Government Legislation Caused a Reinterpretation of a Free Appropriate
Public Education?, 22 EDUC. L. REP. 515, 532-33 (2007) (analyzing a 1999 Department of
Education memo regarding a FAPE under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
165. 20 U.S.C. § 1221-1 (2006).
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interpreting the IDEA.1 66  Promulgating similar regulations for the FAPE
provisions of the IDEA would be appropriate and consistent with Department
of Education precedent and would clarify the proper standard under the IDEA.
2. Recent Amendments to the IDEA and Other Education Laws Demonstrate
Congress's Desire for a Heightened Educational Benefit Under the IDEA
The recent amendments to the IDEA further demonstrate that Congress
intended an appropriate education to be one of meaningful educational
benefit. 167 Congress's intent has apparently evolved from the original
EAHCA, where it aimed simply to increase access to a public education for
students with disabilities,'6 to now aiming to provide "children with
disabilities cognitive access to the challenging public education curriculum, as
provided to all children, in preparation to live adult independent lives."l 69
The legislative history 70 of the 2004 amendments shows the intent of
legislators to provide increased educational opportunities.' 7 1 In a Senate
Health, Education, Pension and Labor Committee hearing, for example, several
166. See, e.g. Molly L. ex rel. B.L. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that the FAPE provisions in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
should be analyzed similarly to the Third Circuit's analysis of a FAPE under the IDEA and "must
provide significant learning and confer meaningful benefit" to the student (quoting T.R. v.
Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
167. See Andrea Valentino, Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act:
Changing What Constitutes an "Appropriate" Education, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 139, 167 (2006)
("The amendments made in the IDEA exhibit intent to implement a heightened substantive
meaning of the word 'appropriate' [and demonstrate] a desire to provide a quality education to
students with disabilities."). The enactment of federal education laws, such as NCLB, has
affected one of the main requirements of a FAPE in the IDEA: that the education services meet
state standards. Daniel & Meinhardt, supra note 164, at 529-30. Current state standards now
include substantive requirements that did not exist at the time of the Rowley decision. Id. at
529-31. Therefore, the IDEA's state-standards requirement now has a different meaning than it
did when the Court decided Rowley. Id
168. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) (explaining that
by passing the EAHCA, "Congress sought primarily to make public education available to
handicapped children").
169. Blau, supra note 14, at 2.
170. Although a majority of the Supreme Court believes that legislative history is an
appropriate means to determine congressional intent, some Justices, most noticeably Justice
Antonin Scalia, believe that the "use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the
interpretation of any statute." Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-11 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia further stated that "that the only language that constitutes 'a Law'
within the meaning of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause of Article 1, § 7, and hence the
only language adopted in a fashion that entitles it to our attention, is the text of the enacted
statute." Id. at 509-10.
171. Blau, supra note 14, at 3 ("Congressional intent in enacting the [2004 IDEA
amendments] reflects a powerful and proactive mission in raising the educational standard and
achievement level for disabled students. Providing children with disabilities entry into the
educational system is no longer the primary motivation.").
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senators spoke about providing increased educational opportunities for
students with disabilities, including the chance to attend college.172 Providing
college preparation indicates an intention to maximize the potential of students
with disabilities.173 Moreover, in a hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Education Reform, the committee chairman stated, "No longer is it simply
enough to provide our children with disabilities access to public schools. Now
more than ever, we must see that children with disabilities are given access to
an education that maximizes their unique abilities and provides them with the
tools for later success."' 74  These statements demonstrate a clear intent to
provide increased educational opportunity for children with disabilities and
maximize their potential.
The text of the amendments also demonstrates congressional intent to
provide more than just nominal educational benefits.' 75 The new language of
the Act requires postsecondary goals including preparation for future
education, employment, or independent living skills.' 76  The IDEA
amendments also declare that "[i]mproving educational results for children
with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities."177
In addition to the recent amendments to the IDEA, other federal education
statutes provide evidence of congressional intent regarding the proper level of
172. IDEA: What's Good for Kids? What Works for Schools?: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 107th Cong. 1-2, 4-5, 26-27 (2002) [hereinafter IDEA:
What's Good for Kids?], available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate
15shl07.html. (statements of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor & Pensions; Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski, and Sen. James M. Jeffords). Senator Kennedy
explained, "We know that children with disabilities should have the same opportunities as every
American to fulfill their hopes and dreams of living independent and productive lives. This
important law provides that opportunity in our public schools." Id. at 1. Senator Mikulski stated
that one of the goals of the IDEA is to provide students with disabilities the opportunity "to live
full, productive lives." Id at 26. Senator Jeffords remarked that the "percentage of college
freshmen with a disability has almost tripled." Id. at 4.
173. Cf U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PREPARING YOUR CHILD FOR COLLEGE: A RESOURCE BOOK
FOR PARENTS 9, 11-12 (2000 ed. 2000), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED44560
2.pdf (describing the challenge and difficulty of college preparatory courses as indicative of a
high level of education).
174. IDEA: Focusing on Improving Results for Children with Disabilities: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Educ. Reform of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 108th Cong. 2
(2003) (statement of Rep. Michael N. Castle, Chairman, Subcomm. on Educ. Reform, H. Comm.
on Educ. & the Workforce), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/house06ch
108.html.
175. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
118 Stat. 2647.
176. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa) (2006).
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2004).
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education for students with disabilities.178  As part of Congress's enacted
statement of national education policy, it "reaffirm[ed], as a matter of high
priority, the Nation's goal of equal educational opportunity" in which students
reach their full potential.179 This statement asserts Congress's intention for
each and every student, regardless of disability, to be afforded an equal
opportunity for a meaningful education. 80 Similar congressional sentiment
appears in NCLB, in which Congress endeavored "to ensure that all children
have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
education," which can be accomplished by meeting the needs of "children with
disabilities."' ' Taken together, this language demonstrates that Congress
intended to provide all students, with or without disabilities, an equal
educational opportunity designed to realize their full academic potential. 82
Although Congress never formally provided a clear definition for an
"appropriate" education under the IDEA,183 evidence of congressional intent
demonstrates that the IDEA amendments and other federal education statutes
espouse a heightened-benefit standard.184 Thus, Congress has made a policy
decision regarding the sufficiency of education for students with disabilities,
but left a gap in the IDEA regarding an "appropriate" education. By defining
an "appropriate" education via regulation as providing a meaningful
educational benefit, the Department of Education would realize congressional
intent and correct the oversight in the IDEA.'85
178. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1221-1 ("[E]very citizen is entitled to an education to meet his or
her full potential without financial barriers."); 20 U.S.C. § 6301 ("[A]ll children have a [right to]
a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education . . .
179. 20 U.S.C. §1221-1.
180. See id.
181. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(2) (2006).
182. See Maria Glod, Law Opens Opportunities for the Disabled, WASH. POST., Mar. 17,
2008, at Bl (describing the many positive effects of NCLB for students with disabilities).
NCLB's "requirement to raise student achievement across the board has forced schools to pay
attention as never before to special-needs children who too often had been written off as
incapable of handling the same lessons as peers in mainstream classrooms." Id NCLB states
that "the same high standards of academic achievement [must be applied] to all public elementary
school and secondary school students in the State ... [and include] separate measureable annual
objectives for continuous and substantial improvement for . . . students with disabilities." 20
U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C) (2006).
183. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
184. See supra notes 167-182 and accompanying text.
185. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) ("The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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3. The Meaningful-Educational-Benefit Standard Is Most Appropriate
Based on Fairness and Equality for Persons with Disabilities
The meaningful-educational-benefit standard, consistent with past
Department of Education definitions of an "appropriate" education and
indicators of congressional intent, is also the fairest standard. As Congress
explained in the IDEA, "Disability is a natural part of the human experience
and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute
to society."I 6  With this language, Congress essentially has stated that
disability is no excuse for educating some individuals to a lower standard than
others. The meaningful-educational-benefit standard accomplishes this goal by
ensuring that all students, regardless of disability, are given the opportunity to
meet their full potential.
In addition to treating all students similarly, the education of students with
disabilities also has the practical effect of maximizing their potential later in
life and therefore "lessening the burden on taxpayers [that would have] to
support nonproductive persons."'8 7  Senator James M. Jeffords further
articulated this point in a committee hearing, stating that the "IDEA has helped
individuals with disabilities become independent, wage-earning, tax-paying
contributors to the Nation."' 88 Thus, by maximizing the potential for persons
with disabilities, the nation will reap the benefits of additional productive, well
educated, and self-sufficient members of society and therefore will have fewer
individuals to support through welfare programs.189
186. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).
187. JONES, supra note 34, at 1-2. As a Senate report for the EAHCA stated,
[t]his Nation has long embraced a philosophy that the right to a free appropriate public
education is basic to equal opportunity and is vital to secure the future and prosperity of
our people. It is contradictory to that philosophy when that right is not assured equally
to all groups of people within the Nation.
S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433. The Senate report
also stated, "With proper education services, many [individuals with disabilities] would be able to
become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens.
Others, through such services, would increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence
on society." Id.
188. IDEA: What's Good for Kids?, supra note 172, at 4 (statement of Sen. James M.
Jeffords). Partially due to federal legislation, such as IDEA and NCLB, "[t]est scores and
classroom grades of disabled students are rising, and their high-school graduation rate increased
to 54% in 2004 from 42% in 1996." John Hechinger & Daniel Golden, Extra Help: When Special
Education Goes Too Easy on Students, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2007, at Al (describing the gains
made by students with disabilities but questioning how those gains were achieved).
189. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A) (stating that Congress found that "30 years of research
and experience has demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be made
more effective by . . . having high expectations for such children and ensuring their access to the
general education curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum extent possible," which
will allow the children "to lead productive and independent adult lives").
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While the costs' 90 of increasing the educational level to a meaningful benefit
may cause school districts to incur additional expenses, recent legislation
passed by the federal government will help ease these funding burdens
significantly. 191 In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the
federal government allocated over $12 billion in increased IDEA funding.192
The billions of dollars of increased federal funding will help to defray costs for
those states that may potentially incur additional expenses in implementing the
IDEA.'93  Additionally, a majority of circuits, cognizant of the fundin
requirements, already follow a heightened educational-benefit-standard.' 9
These circuits provide evidence that the meaningful-educational-benefit
standard is not an untenable financial burden on the states. For these reasons,
the cost of increasing the educational-benefit standard is not an impediment to
raising the standard.
4. Proposed Department ofEducation Regulation
As part of its rulemaking procedure, the Department of Education is required
to hold a public-comment period of no less than seventy-five days.' 9 5 This
comment period will ensure that the public and interested groups have an
190. In passing the EAHCA in 1975, Congress promised to fund 40 percent of the costs for
implementing the new law by fiscal year 1982, with the states funding the remainder. See
Valentino, supra note 167, at 166. The federal government, however, has never promised to pay
for all the costs of a FAPE, nor has it paid the aforementioned 40 percent, so the IDEA has
continuously remained underfunded. Id.; Lisa Fine, UPDATED: With Harkin's Move, Full
Funding for IDEA Gains Momentum, EDUC. WEEK Sept. 10, 2009 (10:43 AM), http://blogs.ed
week.org/edweek/speced/2009/09/updated with harkinsmove full.html. To remedy this,
legislation has been introduced for the federal government to fully fund the IDEA up to 40
percent. Fine, supra. As a lead sponsor of the legislation, Senator Tom Harkin stated, "It is time
for the federal government to make good on its promise to students with disabilities in this
country" by providing full funding. Id. There is a similar proposal in the House of
Representatives to provide federal funding at 40 percent of the total costs. Id.
191. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit VIII, 123
Stat. 115, 182 ("For an additional amount for 'Special Education' for carrying out parts B and C
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ('IDEA'), $12,200,000,000, of which
$11,300,000,000 shall be available for section 611 of the IDEA . . . .").
192. Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Education Department to Distribute $44 Billion
in Stimulus Funds in 30 to 45 Days (Mar. 7, 2009), http://www2.ed.gov/news/press
releases/2009/03/03072009.html.
193. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: IDEA Recovery Funds for
Services to Children and Youths with Disabilities, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Apr. 1, 2009)
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/idea.htmi (describing the impact and
potential uses for the IDEA stimulus money for states). These funds "will provide an
unprecedented opportunity for states, [local educational agencies], and early intervention service
providers to implement innovative strategies to improve outcomes for infants, toddlers, children,
and youths with disabilities while stimulating the economy." Id. Including the stimulus money,
the federal share of funding for the IDEA increased to thirty-four percent. Fine, supra note 190.
The stimulus, however, is only a one-time investment. Id.
194. See supra Part I.B.2.
195. 20 U.S.C. § 1406(c) (2006).
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opportunity to voice any concerns about the regulation and its effects as well as
provide input on the best language to use. At the end of the process, the
written regulation should be similar to the Department of Education's
definition of an "appropriate" education under § 504.196 By mandating that
students with disabilities are educated similarly to students without disabilities,
such a rule would ensure that congressional intent is realized.197 Consequently,
a proper Department of Education regulation, which adheres to congressional
intent, might state: "an appropriate education is one that is designed to meet
the educational needs of students with disabilities as adequately as students
without disabilities to enable every child to receive the meaningful benefit
from his education and meet his full potential."
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Congress has clearly indicated its intent for all students, regardless
of disability, to realize their full potential, the educational standard for students
with disabilities should be one that provides a meaningful educational benefit
rather than merely "some" educational benefit. Because it is in the best
position to establish a nationwide definition, the Department of Education
should define an "appropriate" education under the IDEA. This definition
should ensure a meaningful education for students with disabilities and clearly
enunciate Congress's desire to educate students with disabilities in a manner
similar to all other students. Ultimately, providing this definition will help
realize congressional intent, empower students with disabilities to lead more
productive lives, and increase the fairness and equity of the nation's
special-education laws.
196. See 34 C.F.R. §104.33 (2010).
197. See supra Part III.B.2.
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